## 1NC

The aff appeals to working within the State which proactively encourages a fixed legal order, leaving no room for creative expression of subjectivity. **Deuchars 11**[[1]](#footnote-1)

Deleuze and Guattari use the example of chess against the game go. Chess is clearly a game of state but go is fluid, implying perpetual movement and a game of exteriority. This is not to state, however, that go is without rules or is without form. All games follow rules. In **chess** there is a grid and the space of chess **is “striated”.** There is no exteriority to the grid of chess where each piece possesses intrinsic properties and limited powers. A pawn is always a pawn (except paradoxically unless it can avoid destruction and undergo a metamorphosis when it is promoted at the eighth level, becoming something other, usually a Queen). A Queen, however, cannot become a pawn. But **all** of the **pieces** in chess **follow pre-written rules** or axioms. Each piece can only move within the pre-ordained grid **and there is no way to modify or escape the codes** of chess**.** By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari stress that **the war machine** in this form **has** very **little to do with war proper, but** as in the game go, it follows a guerrilla logic and ‘it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the point of **springing up at any point**: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, **without aim or destination**, without departure or arrival.’ Deleuze and Guattari note that ‘in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines.’ 25In the example here this is typified by the “smooth space” of go, as against the “striated space” of chess. 26Moreover, the war machine is a ‘form of thought so radical that it wages the violence of war on existing orders of knowledge [and] condition’s Deleuze’s politico-philosophical project in its entirety.’ 27 This is Julian Reid’s understanding of the potential for a type of postmodern left resistance to the globalising tendencies of capital, and which has been popularised by Hardt and Negri. However in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Reid does not valorise the vagueness of the “multitude”, which is so effectively undermined by Boron. As he notes in his critique of Empire: if we applied Hardt and Negri’s work to the prosaic reality of contemporary Latin America, we should ask ourselves if the paramilitaries and death squads that razed Chiapas…sewing terror and death, are included in the multitude; or the landowners who organise and finance a great part of the Robert Deuchars private repression exerted in those countries against peasants and aboriginal communities…Do humiliated and exploited peasants form part of the multitude too?28 So again we should be careful in what we think it is plausible to state about two things. Firstly, the war machine is not here to save us and neither is nomadism to be taken out of context. Although Boron is largely correct that the paramilitaries and the death squads are not part of the “multitude”, they most certainly constitute a certain type of war machine as noted above, namely those social formations that can potentially be at antagonistic to the state form but eventually become part of it or “take it over”. This should serve as further warning to scholars in International Relations who (quite rightly) are attracted to a form of leftism that escapes the codification found in the mirror of the state-form, i.e. the vanguardism of the Party, and secondly, the “multitude” as espoused by Hardt and Negri, a different celebratory type of vanguardism without substance, which is at best illusory and, as Boron goes on to say, is a concept that Hardt argues is to be understood poetically and not as fact. 29In other words there is not much empirical support for the “coming together” of such disparate “political communities”. However, when considered as a particular modality of thinking then the Deleuzean concept of the war machine can be taken non-metaphorically as a conceptual tool of politico-cultural resistance. It does have the potential to have real-world significance, but only if understood in the sense of all concepts Deleuze (and Guattari) espouse. In other words, **war machines** have at least a double function. They **can**, on the one hand, serve as affective and active agents of **resist**ance**, but** by the same token **can be captured by the state** form**.** So, as Reid goes on to argue, although resistance and power are caught up in shifting arrangements of deterritorialisation and subsequent reterritorialisation (by capital), ‘**it is not**, therefore, **a question of occupying** a position of **exteriority to power.** Rather**, the exterior is a limit towards which a body projects**(emphasis added).’ 30 Mobility and resistance are central to this type of thinking and one can immediately see in the war machine, which is set in opposition to the apparatus of state capture, the distinctions Deleuze and Guattari make between “smooth” and “striated” space and go against chess. **The** apparatus of **state** capture **will always** attempt to **“striate” space, whereas the war machine will** always attempt to **create “lines of flight” that make space “smooth”.** Similarly chess, no matter how complicated, will never be a game of complexity. It follows axioms, whereas go follows a generalised complex model of continuous change. Despite **it**s general rules, go **becomes something other, always**. In this sense go is similar to the point made at the beginning of A Thousand Plateaus in which Deleuze and Guattari highlight the essential feature of the war machine as follows: The problem of the war machine, or the firing squad: is a general necessary for n individuals to fire in unison? The solution without a General is to be found in an acentred multiplicity possessing a finite number of states with signals to indicate corresponding speeds, from a war rhizome or guerrilla logic point of view, without any tracing, **without** any **copying** of **a central order.** 31 The distinction drawn between the sedentary and the nomadic here can be generalised across practically all aspects of existence as well, from pre-modernity to modernity and in the postmodern condition, too. The word “nomadic” takes on different connotations from the pre-modern nomad and denotes adaptability, movement, shifting patterns of behaviour, “phase transitions” and a continuously shifting calculus between humans and nature. Deleuze and Guattari also introduce here the themes of spontaneous self-organisation, non-linearity and the adaptive nature of complex systems, some things that could also be read as quite sympathetic to a certain ill-defined strain of anarchist thought. Or maybe a certain form of romanticism left remaining as a hangover from Anti-Oedipus, perhaps?

The resolution is agent-less, but the aff proactively chose to defend working within the State, which proves uniqueness.

Just like the status quo State, rehabilitation imposes a fixed or unitary subject position on individuals. The very concept of rehab relies on particular notions of what defines someone as “criminal.” **Polizzi and Arrigo 9**[[2]](#footnote-2)

(Arrigo explores the way in which capitalism through its relationship with the media creates and manipulates the desiring subject and by so doing reduces it to a function of that desire, the state’s desire. He then introduces what he has identified as the “criminology of the stranger” which seeks to free the subject from this endless cycle of objectification and toward the possibility for transformation. Within this context, transformation or **becoming** represents or **introduces us to a** different type of **subject** who is **not reducible to** a set of **socially derived categories. Once liberated from** the **objectifying** quality of these **categories, the possibility of becoming can be realized** insofar as it represents the ontologically unfinished character of being. Taken from a far less theoretical point of reference, the relationship between imposed social categories and the transformation of the subject is easily witnessed through the image of the criminal. In their work, Revolution in Penology, Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) point out the way in which the process of imposed categorization continues to imprison the subject in an ever-evolving cycle of otherness that fundamentally denies being the possibility of transformation. Whether these categories evoke essentalized differences related to ethnicity, gender, or socioeconomic status, the result is still the same. **The individual** caught up **in the c**riminal **j**ustice **s**ystem **is** essentially **reduced to** those **categories imposed by the** system or by **state, and** becomes **socially defined by them. Once** constructed and **coded as criminal,** the **possibilities for being are** greatly **restricted**; however, such restrictions never completely eliminate or preclude the possibility for transformation and it Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 119 remains possible for the individual to employ a variety of strategies of resistance that can liberate the potential for transformation, the potential for becoming other.) Arrigo: The chapter "essentializes" the conspicuous consumption of media manufactured capitalism (by way of Baudrillard's insights), mindful of how such ravenousness fosters what Foucault identified as docility in which **the subject is panoptically reduced to a functionary of the state.** Moreover, the critique draws support by invoking Lacan and his position on the discourse of the master and Fromm's analysis on mechanisms of escape. My view is that the emphasis on "being" rather than "having" is more akin to Aristotle (by way of Fromm), and the emphasis on becoming is closer to Deleuze and Guattari. Chris (Williams) and I don't spell out these transitions other than to invoke the need for a philosophy of the subject or, if you will, a "criminology of the stranger." In my forthcoming book with Dragan Milovanovic titled, Revolution in Penology: Rethinking the Society of Captives, how such a transition would occur is much more fully specified. Here, Dragan and I invoke the work of Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari (e.g., molecular forces; schizoanalysis, rhizomatics; anti-Oedipus), Nietzsche (e.g., overcoming; a will to power), Lacan (e.g., discourse of the hysteric/analyst), complex systems science (e.g., stranger attractors; dissipative structures; far-from-equilibrium conditions), Fromm (e.g., positive freedom; spontaneity) and Derrida (e.g., critique of the metaphysics of presence; reversal of hierarchies). Freire's dialogical pedagogy is also employed in parts. The concern for personal freedom and social responsibility to which you elude is quite important and I agree that Foucault (as you cite him) is instructive. I would further argue, consistent with postmodern or ultramodern sensibilities, that one's presuppositions must be provisional, positional, and relational. I take this to be compatible with Judith Butler's notion of "contingent universalities."Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 120 I like your position on Lacan, even though we differ here. But, of course, Lacan was a Freudian revisionist as you note. So, it follows that the former's observations address the "law-of-the-father" (the Symbolic Order) and not the Real Order. Of course, in his work on Feminine Sexuality (1985) Lacan did make a case for an ecriture feminine; that is, the variable contexts in which a woman's desire or pas toute (not-all) could be reclaimed. I think Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva were better in expressing how a reworking of language was but one dimension of this reframing toward an ecriture feminine. Consider, for instance, Irigaray’s (1985) This Sex Which Is Not One or Kristeva’s (1980) Desire in Language. I don't believe either author would argue that language is an ontological category for the reasons you specify. However, their respective critiques of Lacan seem to understate (misstate?) his view on the topic. Then, too, Deleuze (1983) – often in collaboration with Guattari – (1984, 1987) helped to demonstrate that desire is not "lack" (unless within a Freudian reworking). Instead, it is productive, transmutating, "becoming other;" or as they proclaimed, "a people yet to come.” Once again, language is but one facet of this metamorphosis. (Our conversation moves to a more specific exploration of the concepts of Being as discussed by Heidegger in Being in Time and the notion of becoming, as discussed by Deleuze in his text Nietzsche & Philosophy and Lacan’s notion of the Other. Arrigo applies his discussion of the Lacanian Other to his concept of the shadow. In part, through its speaking the subject, the Other sustains the shadow and the shadow holds us captive. Whereas I see a more fluid development of these ideas from phenomenology to critical theory, to postmodernism, Arrigo maintains that the movement from critical theory to postmodernism is a more accurate read of this ultramodern condition.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 121 This discussion has particular significance for criminology relative to the construction of racism, crime and the criminal other. The liberation of the shadow seems most related to the way in which **certain subject positions**, be these based on race, gender, or socio-economic class, **construct** the subject and **subjectivity and** by so doing, **restrict the possibility of becoming.** Deconstructing these covert forces that discipline and control social presence, allows subjectivity to free itself from this “diminished milieu” (Deleuze, 1983) or, at the very least, allows for this possibility.) Polizzi: But wouldn't you say that ultimately the notion of becoming, which comes from Nietzsche (actually, the pre-Socratics, at least in Western thought), is also situated in Heidegger's notion of being/becoming and isn't this same relationship to being/becoming also present in Merleau-Ponty as well and then brilliantly taken up by many writers in the Post-Modern movement? The notion of docility is also present in the work of Castoriadis, which I believe both pre-dates and overlaps the published writing of Foucault. Castoriadis (1988; 1997) is particularly critical of the role of the proletariat, and uses virtually the same language to describe the problem. I guess my issue with the discourse of the Other is that not only does it evoke the shadow of Heidegger's discussion of authenticy/inauthencity and Heidegger’s concept of the They-Self, but also seems to maintain that we can truly free ourselves from the Other. Though I completely agree with Lacan, at least relative to the internal logic of classical psychoanalysis that subjectivity must find a way to speak for itself and not be spoken through by the discourse of the Other, we are never completely free from this relationship. Perhaps this dovetails somewhat into Fromm's notion of personal freedom and social responsibility. (I have not really read that much of his work.) For personal freedom to be possible it must find a way to not only liberate itself from the desire of the Other or what the Other wants, but also re-establish a relationship with this Other, with the Symbolic Order, that does not deny the legitimacy of that freedom. (Lacan, 2007). Right, to have therefore I am, is not a very liberating foundation for human freedom. The conspicuous consumption of media manufactured capitalism, if I understand you correctly, is the discourse of the Other that not only speaks the subject, but limits any real possibility for personal freedom/social responsibility. My point was that Critical Theory in the end, really only offers more of the same and in the end, may simply invite the possibility for a different type of alienated subject. (Our discussion moves to an exploration of the relationship between phenomenology and postmodernism. Included in this discussion are a variety of theoretical concepts which are not specifically defined. Thrownnnes, a concept introduced by Heidegger (1962), describes the social character of human being. Human being or experience for Heidegger, always finds itself situated or thrown within very specific cultural, historical linguistic or sociological contexts which help to define the possibilities for human being. For example, the possibilities for black experience are fundamentally restricted if “thrown” into a social context of anti-racism, which seeks to criminalize the social presence of blackness. (Polizzi, 2007) The Lacanian concept of the Other represents that aspect of the Lacanian Symbolic registrar that seeks to control desire through its ability to control subjectivity and individual desire. Entry into the symbolic is the entry into language and the confrontation with the desire of the Other. Within both of these concepts we can witness the way in which the possibility for personal experience and responsibility is confronted by a meaning generating process that seeks to control or configure the contours of human experience. In neither of these conceptualizations is there a complete foreclosing of human possibility; however, the potentiality for human expression does remain contingent to this undeniable and unavoidable meaning generating dynamic.) Arrigo: I regretfully confess ignorance on the work of Castoriadis. I need to rectify this as you have referenced his work a number of times in our email, phone, or inperson conversations. Thank you! I agree with the development of thought on being/becoming as you delineate it above. I also agree that we can never free ourselves entirely from the "Other" as in Heidegger's (1962) notion of "thrownness," or, if you will, as in Buber's notion of the I-Thou relationship. But why would we want to and, more philosophically, why should we? As you correctly point out, the question is the character of this thrownness, the character of the I-Thou relationship (Buber, 1970), the character of the "Other" (when placed in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms), or the character of Heidegger's (1962) dasein analytic as in a being-toward-care. And it is here that authenticity or alethia (interestingly, for Aristotle it is eudaimonia or excellence as in a flourishing of being; as in living a virtuous existence), that comes into play. Does the critical theory-to-postmodern movement merely substitute one form of alienation for another? Perhaps, however, I think the latter’s reading of the "ultramodern" condition is a bit more accurate than any other and, to this extent, makes for a compelling critique of the zeitgeist beyond what their philosophical predecessors identified. Of course, this is not to dismiss their predecessors as much as to assess the relative contribution such antecedent philosophy offers in an account of any existing issue. Still, the question is how to confront the crisis that sustains the "shadow" in society and in our lives today. This is a crisis in which the call to personal freedom and social responsibility must be re-conceptualized. From my perspective, this implicates a new theory of the subject or, if you will, a philosophy of the stranger. In part, I believe that Revolution in Penology endeavors Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 124 to tackle this very vexing, but prescient, problem. We'll have to see what the reviewers/critics of the book have to say about this. (A question is raised concerning the philosophical implications toward a postmodern/ poststructural understanding of language. It is argued that such formulations cover over an implicit structuralist understanding of the role of language that, at its worst, reduces existence and subjectivity to that of a collection of epiphenomenal artifacts of this process. For example, the sign, “criminal,” can only construct a variety of signification that remains more or less consistent and contingent upon this beginning category, but this process does not and cannot construct the actual presence of the sign, the presence of this actual human being, only its diminished meaning. This section of the conversation is related in part to the earlier discussion of the shadow in criminology and the need for its transformation; existing categories imposed upon the subject work in concert with the signifying process erected by language, which results in the diminishment of human possibility. **To be constructed as** offender or even **former offender, still carries** with it the **crippling affects of imposed social meaning. A** word or **concept like rehab**ilitation or restorative justice rather than invite the possibility of transformation **remains caught within** this process of **objectified meaning** that continues to deny being or subjectivity the full breath of its potential.

The aff assumes the existence of a unified, ideal subject. Modern society relies on this concept to restrict individuals from pursuing different ways of being.

**Invisible Committee 9**[[3]](#footnote-3)

“I AM WHAT I AM.” Never has domination found a more above-suspicion slogan. The maintenance of an “I” that’s in a permanent state of semi-disrepair, in a chronic state of semi-failure, is the best kept secret of the present order of things. The weak, depressed, self-critical, virtual “I” is essentially the indefinitely adaptable subject that requires a production based on innovation, the accelerated obsolescence of technologies, the constant upheaval of social norms, and generalized flexibility. At the same time the most voracious consumer, and, paradoxically, the most productive “I,” it will throw itself with the most energy and avidity into the slightest project, only to come back later to the embryonic state it started from. **“WHAT AM I**,**”** then**?** Washed since childhood in the waves: milk, smells, stories, sounds, emotions, nursery rhymes, substances, gestures, ideas, impressions, looks, songs, and foods. What am I? **I’m** totally **tied to places, sufferings,** ancestors, **friends**, loves, events, languages, memories, all kinds of things **that** obviously **are not me. Everything that attaches me to the world**, all the links that comprise me, all the forces that populate me – they **don’t weave an identity, though I am encouraged to wield one**, but an existence: singular, common, living, and from which emerges - in places, at certain moments - that being that says “I.” Our **feeling of inconsistency is** only **the effect of** this **foolish belief in the permanence of the “I,” and** the very slight **concern we give to what makes us.** It’s dizzying to see Reebok’s “I AM WHAT I AM” enthroned atop a Shanghai skyscraper. The West is advancing everywhere, with its favorite Trojan horse: the murderous antimony between the “I” and the world, the individual and the group, between attachment and freedom. Freedom isn’t the gesture of liberation from attachments, but the practical capacity to operate upon them, to move around in them, to establish or cut them off. The family only exists as a family, that is, as hell, for those who have renounced the project of altering its debilitating mechanisms, or don’t know how. The freedom to tear oneself out has always been the mere phantom of liberty. We won’t get free of what’s holding us back without losing at the same time that which our strength could be exercised on. “I AM WHAT I AM,” then, is not just a simple lie, a simple advertising campaign, but a military campaign, a war-cry directed against everything there is between people, against everything that circulates indistinctly, everything that ties them invisibly together, everything that puts an obstacle in the way of perfect desolation, against everything that makes it so we exist and the world doesn’t just look like one big highway everywhere, an amusement park or one of the new cities: pure boredom; passionless, but well-ordered; empty, frozen space where nothing moves besides the duly registered bodies, the automobile molecules and the ideal commodities. France couldn’t be the fatherland of anxiety-pills, the anti-depressant paradise, the Mecca of neurosis that it is if it weren’t for its simultaneously being the European champion of hourly productivity. **Sickness, fatigue, depression**, can be seen as the individual symptoms of a bigger disease that needs to be cured. They **contribute to** the **maintenance of the existing order,** to my **docile adjustment to idiotic conventions and norms**, my adjustment to my modernized crutches. They are the thin veil on my8 selection of opportune, compliant, productive penchants, and on those penchants that they’ll soon be amicably mourning. **“You’ve got to** be able to **change, you know.”** But taken as facts, **my failures** can also lead to the **dismantle**ment of the hypothesis of **the “I.” They** then **become acts of resistance** in the war that’s going on. They become a rebellion and an energetic core holding out **against everything that conspires to normalize** us, to amputate us. It’s not our “I” that’s in a state of crisis, but the form in which we seek to impress ourselves upon the world. They want to make us into various manifestations of a well-delimited, well separated, classable “I,” able to have its various qualities checked off; – controllable – when in fact we are but creatures among the creatures, singularities among similar peers, living flesh weaving the flesh of the world. Contrary to what we have repeated to us since childhood, intelligence doesn’t mean knowing how to adapt... or if it is a kind of intelligence, it’s the intelligence of slaves. Our non-adaptation, our fatigue, are only problems from the point of view of what’s trying to subjugate us. They indicate, rather, a departure point, a junction point for unusual complicities. They let us see an otherwise more dilapidated but infinitely more shared landscape than all the hallucinatory landscapes that this society maintains for itself. We aren’t depressed; we’re on strike. For those who refuse to manage themselves, “depression” is not a state, but a passage, a good bye, a step to the side towards a political disaffiliation. And from then on there’s no possible reconciliation besides medications and the police. Indeed, **that’s why this society** has no fear of imposing Ritalin so much on its too-lively children or of fixing people into life-long dependency on pharmaceuticals, and **claims to** be able to **detect “behavioral troubles”** at three years of age**:** becausethe hypothesis of **the “I” is cracking everywhere.**

3 impacts.

a. Normalization is the tool of Eurocentric powers to alienate knowledge production that opposes oppression. This guarantees violence. **Djunatan 11**[[4]](#footnote-4)

Deleuze and Guattari uncover the real intent of North Atlantic theoretical knowledge. They note: “However, it is difficult to believe that it is the rise ‘of philosophy and the mutually inclusive sciences’ that accounts for this privilege of a peculiarly European transcendental subject. Rather, the infinite movement of thought, what Husserl calls Telos, must enter into conjunction with the great relative movement of capital that is continually deterritorialized in order to secure the power of Europe over all other peoples and their reterritorialization on Europe.”580 The real face of **the transcendental subject**, the Same or the Man **is** the **reterritorialization of Europe’s privilege** of capital **and power** over all other subjects. In this sense any local knowledge systems, including the **African, Asian or Islamic systems of knowledge, are categorized as esoteric** or gnosis**, rather than** accountable and **accessible** theories of the world or epistemé.581 The establishment of **the transcendental subject**, the Man necessarily **results in** the **disappearance of** the experiential self which affects the contextual signification of the self. The uprooted **self-identity from its context** appears as the serious consequence of this dissolution of the empirical self. The effect is substantive. **There is no** other **standard** of individuality **except** the **Western accounts of the** conceptual **person**a or the Man**. The corollary** of this **is** either the hegemony of self-identification or the **exclusion** of the undesired representation from the arena of true identification **and realization of** the **power** and the capital representation **by** means of **violence.**

Eurocentric subjectification is predicated on a false objectivity. The alternative is an epistemological prerequisite to the aff. **Djunatan 11**[[5]](#footnote-5)

The example above also articulates the problem of **knowing in accordance with** the **Western** philosophical **discourse**. Knowing in this sense is not only the intention to perceive an object, but it is also the arrangement of the representation of the perception by means of principles of thought. This arrangement includes the empirical approach to the appearance of the things-in-themselves as the initial phase of knowing, and after this phase, what we knows is “independent of all experiences”541 in so far as it **is no longer about** the correspondent correlation between **sensuous capacity** and the appearance as such, nor is it the intuitive apprehension of the phenomena.Instead, the higher capacity of thinking implies the management of the cognitive representation by means of categories (by the understanding) and logic (by pure reason). The problem of knowing then concerns the independency of a concept. **A concept is** not only **excluded from** the experience of **phenomena**, in order **to guarantee** the **unconditioned** presupposition of its **common sense**, but it is also individualized from other concepts. The independence of a concept of all experiences and other is necessarily required as the unconditioned foundation for the concept itself to be intelligible. Deleuze and Guattari argue this independency of concept by saying that a concept basically contains a combination of multiple components. Given this content, a concept implies a ground which affects the intelligibility of it. The multiple components of a concept are cross-cutting so that a concept is a representation of wholeness, yet it is the fragmentary whole.542 These French philosophers suggest the significance of the relationship between (among) concepts in order to affirm the intelligibility, and more importantly, the existence of the concept. By taking into account the discourse of “I” as the subject who exists in front of the other, **Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that** the **understanding** of **a concept requires** the **reciprocal presentation between** concepts as it is between **“I” and the other**. The representation of I necessarily affirms the presentation of the other **so that** reciprocally **I** as the knowing subject **experience my self-identity** and my existence. It is precisely regarding the independency of concepts that lays the problem of knowing. Reason as the higher faculty of thinking treats concept as the simple and singular representation of knowledge as if the concept were the synthetic judgement in accordance with the regulative ideality. Deleuze and Guattari argue that **the ideality** of the singularity **and** the **simplicity of the concept** take a viewpoint that **ignores** the **relativity of concepts.** A concept contains three inseparable components according to these French philosophers. They are the possible world, the existing face and the real language or speech. These components associate a concept with a field of experience which presupposes the determination of the sensory world as a condition. A concept in this sense is expressed as a face before a possible world of the other concept. The face and the possible world of the other concept have their forms through the usage of the real language and speech.543

b. The desire to normalize and order life makes extinction inevitable. Only the alternative solves. **Guattari 2k**[[6]](#footnote-6)

The Earth is undergoing a period of intense techno-scientific transformations. If no remedy is found, the **ecological disequilbrium** this has generated **will** ultimately **threaten** the continuation of **life on the planet**’s surface**.** Alongside these upheavals, **human modes of life,** both individual and collective, **are** progressively deteriorating. Kinship networks tend to be reduced to a bare minimum; domestic life is being poisoned by the gangrene of mass-media consumption; family and married life are frequently **‘ossified’ by** a sort of **standardization** of behaviour; and neighbourhood relations are generally reduced to their meanest expression . . . It is the relationship between subjectivity and its exteriority – be it social, animal, vegetable or Cosmic – that is compromised in this way, in a sort of general movement of implosion and regressive infantalization. Otherness tends to lose all its asperity. Tourism, for example, usually amounts to no more than a journey on the spot, with the same redundancies of images and behavior. **Political groupings** and executive authorities appear to be totally incapable of understanding the full implications of these issues. Despite having recently initiated a partial realization of the most obvious dangers that threaten the natural environment of our societies, they are generally content tosimply **tackle** industrial **pollution** and then **from a purely technocratic perspective**, whereas only an ethico-political articulation – which I call ecosophy— between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations, and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify these questions. Henceforth it is the ways of living on this planet that are in question, in the context of the acceleration of **techno-scientific mutations** and of considerable demographic growth. Through the continuous development of machinic labour, multiplied by the information revolution, productive forces can **make** available an increasing amount of time for potential human activity. But to what end? Unemployment, oppressive **marginalization,** loneliness, boredom, **anxiety and neurosis**? Or culture, creation, development, the reinvention of the environment and the enrichment of modes of life and sensibility? In both the Third World and the developed world, whole sections of the collective subjectivity are floundering or simply huddle around archaisms; as is the case, for example, with the dreadful rise of religious fundamentalism. The only true response to the ecological crisis is on a global scale, provided that is brings about an authentic political, **social** and cultural **revolution**, **reshaping** the objectives of the **production** of both material and immaterial assets. Therefore this revolution must not be exclusively concerned with visible relations of force on a grand scale, but **will** also **take into account molecular** domains of sensibility, intelligence and **desire.** A finalization of social labour, regulated in a univocal way by a **profit** economy **and** by **power** relations, would only **lead**, at present, **to dramatic dead-ends.** This is obvious from the absurd and burdensome economic supervisions of the Third World, which lead some of its regions into an absolute and irreversible pauperization. It is equally evident in countries like France, where the proliferation of nuclear power stations threatens, over a large part of Europe, the possible consequences of Chernobyl-style accidents. One need hardly mention the almost delirious **stockpiling of** thousands of **nuclear warheads**, which, at the slightest technical or human error, **could** automatically **lead to** collective **extermination.** In all of these examples it is the same **dominant** modes of **valorizing** human **activities** that **are implicated.** That is to say 1. Those of the imperium [Latin: ‘authority’] of a global market that destroys specific value system and puts on the same plane of equivalence: material assets, cultural assets, wildlife areas, etc. 2. Those that place all social and international relations under the control of police and military machines. Trapped in this double pincer movement, the nation **States** see their traditional role of mediation behind reduced more and more, and they **are** frequently **put in** the combined **service of** the authorities of **the global market**place **and** of **military-industrial complex**es.

c. K turns the case. Empirics prove that categorization of individuals as criminals kills solvency and increases crime. **Traison 6**[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Deemed by sedentary society as criminals, a large part of** the **hobo culture was** its constant **association with jails.** According to anthropologist James Spradley, it was precisely the indiscriminate imprisonment of tramps that contributed to their criminal nature. Writing about the experience of Seattle’s tramps in the 1960’s, Spradley argues that it was the **repeated incarceration of tramps** that **caused** an increase in **alcoholism** in hobos**,** and **not the other way around.** His is a description of **men** who consciously **choose to leave** home **for the road, only to turn alcoholic after** being caught in a continuous cycle of **being charged for drunk behavior**. One of the tramps in his account explains that often, he was imprisoned for being publicly drunk**, even if he had been sober.** “This time I wasn’t drunk...Just wrong place – wrong time…cannot convince me that being drunk is a crime. Being broke is,” wrote the tramp. Spradley posits that while tramps were charged for public drunkenness, **usually their only crime was** just **appearing poor.** Spradley explains that this **constant criminalization** actively **contributed to** the tramp’s **redefinition** of himself **as a criminal rather than a free spirit.** “Whereas new self identities may be acquired throughout the lifespan, dramatic changes in personality can only occur if these former identities are subjected to radical manipulation. The jailing of tramps is not the only factor in their loss of their former self-conceptions and the acquisition of a new lifestyle, but it is certainly one of the most important.” Further, Spradley argues that the continuous **criminalization** of tramps **did not contribute to their** sedentarization or **“rehab**ilitation**,” but** ratherfurther **perpetuated** a cycle of **criminal nomadism.**

The alternative is to embrace the agency of the schizophrenic by no longer viewing criminals as unitary subjects. Since identity is not static or unified, opening up space for more authentic forms of being should be the starting point of ethics.

**Deleuze and Guattari 83**[[8]](#footnote-8)

**A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic** lying on the analyst's couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world. Lenz's stroll, for example, as reconstructed by Buchner. This walk outdoors is different from the moments when Lenz finds himself closeted with his pastor, who **force[d]**s him **to situate** himself **socially**, in relationship to the God of established religion, in relationship to his father, to his mother. **While taking a stroll** outdoors, on the other hand, **he is** in the mountains, amid falling snowfiakes, with other gods or without any gods at all, without a family, without a father or a mother, **with nature.** "What does my father want? Can he offer me more than that? Impossible. Leave me in peace."1 Everything is a machine. Celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the sky, alpine machines— all of them connected to those of his body. The continual whirr of machines. "He thought that **it must be** a feeling of **endless bliss** to be in contact with the profound life of every form, to have a soul for rocks, metals, water, and plants, to take into himself, as in a dream, every element of nature, like flowers that breathe with the waxing and waning of the moon."la To be a chlorophyll- or a photosynthesis-machine, or at least slip his body into such machines as one part among the others. Lenz has projected himself back to a time before the man-nature dichotomy, before all the co-ordinates based on this fundamental dichotomy have been laid down. He does not live nature as nature, but as a process of production. There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: **the self and** the **non-self**, outside and inside, **no longer have** any **meaning** whatsoever**.** Now that we have had a look at this stroll of a schizo, let us compare what happens when Samuel Beckett's characters decide to venture outdoors. Their various gaits and methods of self-locomotion constitute, in and of themselves, a finely tuned machine. And then there is the function of the bicycle in Beckett's works: what relationship does the bicycle-horn machine have with the mother-anus machine? "What a rest to speak of bicycles and horns. Unfortunately it is not of them I have to speak, but of her who brought me into the world, through the hole in her arse if my memory is correct."2 It is often thought that Oedipus\* is an easy subject to deal with, something perfectly obvious, a "given" that is there from the very beginning. But that is not so at all: Oedipus presupposes a fantastic repression of desiring-machines. And why are they repressed? To what end? Is it really necessary or desirable to submit to such repression? And what means are to be used to accomplish this? What ought to go inside the Oedipal triangle, what sort of thing is required to construct it? Are a bicycle horn and my mother's arse sufficient to do the job? Aren't there more important questions than these, however? Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for? Can we possibly guess, for instance, what a knife rest is used for if all we are given is a geometrical description of it? Or yet another example: on being confronted with a complete machine made up of six stones in the right-hand pocket of my coat (the pocket that serves as the source of the stones), five stones in the right-hand pocket of my trousers, and five in the left-hand pocket (transmission pockets), with the remaining pocket of my coat receiving the stones that have already been handled, as each of the stones moves forward one pocket, how can we determine the effect of this circuit of distribution in which the mouth, too, plays a role as a stone-sucking machine? Where in this entire circuit do we find the production of sexual pleasure? At the end of Malone Dies, Lady Pedal takes the schizophrenics out for a ride in a van and a rowboat, and on a picnic in the midst of nature: an infernal machine is being assembled. "Under the skin the body is an over-heated factory,/ and outside,/ the invalid shines,/ glows,/ from every burst pore."3 This does not mean that we are attempting to make nature one of the poles of schizophrenia. What **the schizophrenic experiences**, both as an individual and as a member of the human species, is not at all any one specific aspect of nature, but **nature as** a process of **production**. What do we mean here by process? It is probable that at a certain level nature and industry are two separate and distinct things: from one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature; from another, industry extracts its raw materials from nature; from yet another, it returns its refuse to nature; and so on. Even within society, this characteristic man-nature, industry-nature, society-nature relationship is responsible for the dis- tinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are called production, distribution, consumption. But in general this entire level of distinctions, examined from the point of view of its formal developed structures, presupposes (as Marx has demonstrated) not only the existence of capital and the division of labor, but also the false consciousness that the capitalist being necessarily acquires, both of itself and of the supposedly fixed elements within an overall process. For the real truth of the matter—the glaring, sober truth that resides in delirium—is that there is no such thing as relatively independent spheres or circuits: production is immediately consumption and a recording process (enregistrement\*), without any sort of mediation, and the recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they do so within the production process itself. Hence everything is production**: production of** productions, of **actions and** of **passion**s; productions of recording processes, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain. Everything is production, since the recording processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions directly reproduced. This is the first meaning of process as we use the term: incorporating recording and consumption within production itself, thus making them the productions of one and the same process. Second, we make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species. Industry is then no longer considered from the extrinsic point of view of utility, but rather from the point of view of its fundamental identity with nature as production of man and by man.4 Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe. This is the second meaning of process as we use the term: man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other—not even in the sense of bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or expression (cause and effect, subject and object, etc.); rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. **Production as process** overtakes all idealistic categories and **constitutes** a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of **an immanent principle.** That is why **desiring**-production **is the principal concern of** a materialist psychiatry, which conceives of and deals with **the schizo as Homo natura.** This will be the case, however, only on one condition, which in fact constitutes the third meaning of process as we use the term: it must not be viewed as a goal or an end in itself, nor must it be confused with an infinite perpetuation of itself. **Putting an end to the process** or prolonging it indefinitely—which, strictly speaking, is tantamount to ending it abruptly and prematurely— **is what creates the artificial schizophrenic found in mental institutions**: a limp rag forced into autistic behavior, produced as an entirely separate and independent entity. D. H. Lawrence says of love: "We have pushed a process into a goal. The aim of any process is not the perpetuation of that process, but the completion thereof. . . . The process should work to a completion, not to some horror of intensification and extremity wherein the soul and body ultimately perish."5 Schizophrenia is like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary production as "the essential reality of man and nature." Desiring-machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled with another. The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature: "and . . ." "and then . . ." This is because there is always a flow-producing machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the breast—the mouth). And because the first machine is in turn connected to another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off, the binary series is linear in every direction.

Reject the aff’s appeals to internal reforms that make the State seemingly less normalizing. We cannot rely on the State to solve global problems. Also, the perm fails. Complete rethinking of the State and CJS is key.

**Deleuze and Foucault 72**[[9]](#footnote-9)

FOUCAULT: It seems to me that the political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different aspects of his activity: his position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the ideology it produces or imposes (his exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of politicisation did not exclude each other, but, being of a different order, neither did they coincide. Some were classed as "outcasts" and others as "socialists." During moments of violent reaction on the part of the authorities, these two positions were readily fused: after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940. The intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible, when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes. The intellectual spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience, consciousness, and eloquence. In the most recent upheaval (3) the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power-the idea of their responsibility for "consciousness" and discourse forms part of the system. **The intellectual**'s role **is** no longer to place himself "somewhat ahead and to the side" in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is **to struggle against** the **forms of power that transform him into its object** and instrument in the sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse. "(4) In this sense **theory** does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it **is local and regional,** as you said, and **not totalising**. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to "awaken consciousness" that we struggle (the masses have been aware for some time that consciousness is a form of knowledge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A "theory " is the regional system of this struggle. DELEUZE: Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We don't revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others. It is strange that it was Proust, an author thought to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don't suit you, find another pair; I leave it to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an investment for combat. A theory does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalise and it is your position. and one I fully agree with, that **theory is by nature opposed to power.** As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular point, we realise that it will never possess the slightest practical importance unless it can erupt in a totally different area. **This is why the notion of reform is** so **stupid** and hypocritical**.** Either reforms are designed by people who claim to be representative, who make a profession of speaking for others, and they lead to a division of power, to a distribution of this new power which is consequently increased by a double repression; or they arise from the complaints and demands of those concerned. **This** latter instance **is no longer** a **reform but revolutionary action that questions** (expressing the full force of its partiality) the **totality of power and** the **hierarchy** that maintains it. This is surely evident in prisons: the smallest and most insignificant of the prisoners' demands can puncture Pleven's pseudoreform (5). If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system. **There is no denying** that our social system is totally without tolerance; this accounts for its extreme fragility in all its aspects and also its need for a global form of repression. In my opinion, you were the first-in your books and in the practical sphere-to teach us something absolutely fundamental: **the indignity of speaking for others.** Pe ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this "theoretical" conversion-to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf. FOUCAULT: And when the prisoners began to speak, they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal system, and justice. It isthis form of discourse which ultimately matters, a discourse against power, the counter-discourse of prisoners and those we call delinquents-and not a theory about delinquency. The problem of prisons is local and marginal: not more than 100,000 people pass through prisons in a year. In France at present, between 300,000 and 400,000 have been to prison. Yet this marginal problem seems to disturb everyone. I was surprised that so many who had not been to prison could become interested in its problems, surprised that all those who bad never heard the discourse of inmates could so easily understand them. How do we explain this? Isn't it because, in a general way, the penal system is the form in which power is most obviously seen as power? To place someone in prison, to confine him to deprive him of food and heat, to prevent him from leaving, making love, etc.-this is certainly the most frenzied manifestation of power imaginable. The other day I was speaking to a woman who bad been in prison and she was saying: "Imagine, that at the age of forty, I was punished one day with a meal of dry bread." What is striking about this story is not the childishness of the exercise of power but the cynicism with which power is exercised as power, in the most archaic, puerile, infantile manner. As children we learn what it means to be reduced to bread and water. **Prison is** the only place **where power is manifested** in its naked state, **in its most excessive form, and where it is justified as moral force. "**I am within my rights to punish you because you know that it is criminal to rob and kill . . . ... What is fascinating about prisons is that, for once, power doesn't hide or mask itself; it reveals itself as tyranny pursued into the tiniest details; it is cynical and at the same time pure and entirely "justified," because its practice can be totally formulated within the framework of morality. Its brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder. DELEUZE: Yes, and the reverse is equally true. Not only are prisoners treated like children, but children are treated like prisoners. Children are submitted to an infantilisation which is alien to them. On this basis, it is undeniable that schools resemble prisons and that factories are its closest approximation. Look at the entrance to a Renault plant, or anywhere else for that matter: three tickets to get into the washroom during the day. You found an eighteenth-century text by Jeremy Bentham proposing prison reforms; in the name of this exalted reform, be establishes a circular system where the renovated prison serves as a model and where the individual passes imperceptibly from school to the factory, from the factory to prison and vice versa. This is the essence of the reforming impulse, of reformed representation. On the contrary, when people begin to speak and act on their own behalf, they do not oppose their representation (even as its reversal) to another; they do not oppose a new representativity to the false representativity of power. For example, I remember your saying that there is no popular justice against justice; the reckoning takes place at another level.

Thus the Role of the Ballot

This 1NC is an act of protest. I use the debate space to challenge the normalization that the status quo State enables. Voting Aff doesn’t actually make the CJS rehabilitative, but the ballot can be instrumental to eluding State norms in everyday life. This is key to examining our assumptions about ethics, so it’s an epistemological prerequisite. Arab Spring proves this is a fight we can win. Protest transcends physical location, so the K spills over outside the round. **Greene and Kuswa 12**[[10]](#footnote-10)

A Korean Wobbly, the living memory of the Zapatistas, college students, and Indignados from Spain all share the spirit of trust built from protests held in other places and fold onto one another to produce a new protest place. The effect can be likened to Deleuze’s notion of the diagram, ‘‘For each diagram testifies to the twisting line of the outside . . . without beginning or end, an oceanic line that passes through all points of resistance, pitches diagrams against one another, and operates always as the most recent’’ (44). The twist of different places of **protest** from outside **challenges** a **vertical** diagram of a general **assembly** with a horizontal assembly. A horizontal accent teaches a protester how to become a protester. A subject, Deleuze writes, ‘‘is created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power’’ (105). The movement of places of protest provides a focal point for the making of the protesting subject. But these folds generate a new protester with each fold: ‘‘The **struggle for subjectivity presents itself** . . . **as the right of difference**, variation **and metamorphosis’’** (106). The movement of a given external place of protest, a place from another time and another place, weaving together the inventional resources for a new political subject, brings a new protester into being each time new groups assemble with others. The rhetorical movement of these protest places, currently encapsulated by Zuccotti Park or Tahrir Square, makes a horizontal journey across territory and history, while bumping up against other contexts and possibilities through memories of protest. One such memory of protest emerges through the way Martin Luther King’s rhetorical rationality and practices of non-violence found their way to Egypt. The constitutive power of non-violent direct action expressed in the protest place of Montgomery, Alabama in the Jim Crow South, travels to Egypt through the rhetorical labor of Dalia Zaida, an Egyptian Human Rights activist who translated and distributed the 1958 English comic book Martin Luther King and the Montgomery Story into Arabic fifty years later (HAMSA). The Fellowship for Reconciliation published the comic book to memorialize, to teach, and to persuade people. Dalia Zaida translated the comic books into Arabic in 2008 and brought them to Tahrir Square during the protests in early 2011 282 Greene and Kuswa Downloaded by [Georgia State University] at 17:02 24 March 2013 (‘‘Martin Luther King’s Idea Reverberate in Egypt’’). The memory of places of protest makes new political subjects possible through the horizontal trajectory of a comic book and its regional translations.The **Arab Spring inaugurates itself** as an outside able to move horizontally in space and time. Alain Badiou praises the people’s movements in Tunisia and Egypt as examples of revolutionary action **outside** the imperial control of **the** nation-**state**’s sovereignty. Badiou goes so far as to proclaim the ‘‘right to rebel’’ and the need of ‘‘rupture’’ in the face of ‘‘a collective feeling of revulsion at those who occupy state power.’’ Not only does the political subjectivity of the Arab Spring compose itself through occupations of public spaces, protests, and strikes, ‘‘the fact that a revolt against state power can be absolutely victorious is a teaching of universal significance’’ (Badiou). The **Arab Spring teaches** new **places of protest that they can win**, that they can and should desire their liberation. As Strathausen notes, the enactment or articulation of these teachings—these moments of shared pedagogy across movements—can be seen in the way folds of protest will shrink distances, intensify experiences, and magnify connections because ‘‘everything folds up, splits open, multiplies, and connects with everything else’’ (3). As noted in this essay’s opening scene, Asmaa Mahfouz leaves Tahrir Square and leads a teach-in at Zuccotti Park, informing Amy Goodman that ‘‘I am here to be in solidarity and support the Occupy Wall Street protesters, to say to them ‘power to the people,’ and to keep it on and on, and they will succeed in the end’’ (Goodman 134). **Mahfouz’s solidarity with Occupy** is a reiteration of the power of the people, a reinvigoration of the pedagogical moment of the Arab Spring that **suggests** a much wider affective spectrum than simple outrage and indignation defining a typical protest scene. The **horizontal movement** between regional places of protest **is magnified by** the affective charges of **bodies** coming together in direct action. The places of protest are moved into=against=with other places of protest as bodies are affected by other bodies **communicating** with one another. Matthew S. May explains that ‘‘to communicate is to affect and be affected by other bodies. Bodies that communicate a common notion compose an aggregate body which may itself be part of a larger composition’’ (1). To be sure, these places of protest rely on an embodied rhetoric (Endres and Selma-Cook) of humans in place, but the horizontal movement of affect is charged by the way those places form a body of protest in communication with other places in protest, **thereby composing a common body** in the fold **between physical locations.** As May notes, ‘‘the communication of bodily composition theoretically may extend in an infinite spiral . . . depending on the capacity of the bodies in question to affect and be affected by other bodies’’ (1). As Mahfouz puts it: ‘‘power to the people . . . keep it on and on.’’ David Graeber describes the affective movement at Occupy as contagious: ‘‘the politics of direct action is based, to a certain degree, on a faith that freedom is contagious’’ (28). This **faith in freedom is** an affective surplus constituted by a horizontal faith in one another to form a compositional power **more powerful than** the reterritorializing machines ofcapitalism and **the State.** Graeber highlights the ontological power of a common body: ‘‘theexperience of thousands of people, motivated only by principle and **solidarity**, linking arms to hold their ground **against** a phalanx of armored **riot cops, can change one’s** most **fundamental assumptions about** what **politics**—**or** for that matter, human **life**, could actually be’’ (28). Outrage, faith in freedom, and power to=of the people are different ways to express the affective dimensions of protest places in common. For these places of protest to move regionally they must produce a surplus that sustains a common body of protest, ‘‘an increase in compositional power’’ (Hamilton and Holdren). In the opening scene of this essay, Glenn G. describes this common compositional power as more than just an act of resistance but also as ‘‘an adaptable community of resistance’’ (7). He calls on the Occupy Movement to nurture a community of resistance for the ‘‘meta-mind of our social movement to thrive because it will, if navigated skillfully, lead to building trust. And this is the dangerous part for the 1%’’ (7). Common bodies affectively bound by trust make places of protest as the communities of resistance are moved by the ‘‘meta-mind’’ of the movement. A horizontal regional accent stresses the movement between protest places, producing a region in protest. Communication technologies provide another means by which places of protest form; they invent regions in=of protest. Communication technology exists as a means of persuasion and a site of contestation. Communication technologies did not cause the Arab Spring, but they did provide a way for protest places to interact with other protest places. Reporting in January of 2011, Dina Zayed writes ‘‘Al Jazeera was one of the first outlets to broadcast pictures of [Mohamed Bouazizi].’’ Moreover, she notes that ‘‘when street protests ousted the Tunisian President, 26 year old Egyptian Sabah first heard it in a call from a friend who told her: Switch on Al Jazeera’’ (Zayed). Zied Abu Oudeh testifies to the technologies of presence made possible by Al Jazeera: ‘‘Al Jazeera was like one of those protesting in the streets of Tunis and made people live with the events’’ (qtd. in Zayed). The experience of Al Jazeera as protester was magnified by their use of mobile phone footage to circumvent Tunisian restrictions on their reporters being physically present (Zayed). Their mobile phone footage also allowed those not situated in Tunisia a way to ‘‘live’’ the event of protest with those on the ground in Tunis. In Egypt, social media tools mobilized protesters, but so too did the video speech of Asmaa Mahfouz posted online. This speech implored Egyptians to transform Tahrir Square into a protest place by turning away from some media: ‘‘Sitting at home and just following us on news or facebook leads to our humiliation’’ (asamahfous.com). What Mahfouz teaches is that the body of protest is produced in and through the assembly of communication techniques, technologies, and communicative labor. As Anna Lekas Miller narrates the horizontal accent of regional protest: ‘‘I checked twitter when I woke up the morning of September 17. Someone had tweeted, ‘with Love to New York, from #SididBouzid to #OccupyWallStreet’ and I knew it was actually happening’’ (50). Protests move with love. 284 Greene and Kuswa Downloaded by [Georgia State University] at 17:02 24 March 2013 Vlad Teichberg, a member of the media team at Occupy Wall Street, emphasizes the importance of a movement producing its own media ‘‘because we had this 24 hour stream coming out, we became the reference point for what this movement was about . . . . We were able to define us and put our humanity, our people first, in front of the whole world’’ (53). The assembly of these different media technologies in egalitarian and democratic ways produces their horizontal access of regional protest. Can the protest places of horizontal regionalism go global? The scene that begins this essay suggests the answer might be yes: protest places appear on every continent, and each of these protest places claim allegiance to, and solidarity with, the Arab Spring and=or the Occupy Movement (Apps; Johannsen). However, this global protest requires regional articulations of places of protest. Can the compositional power of the people keep going and going (Mahfouz)? The calls for ‘‘#GlobalSpring for #Global Change’’ have been sounded: ‘‘Fellow Humans, People from the Indignados and Occupy movements from across the world call for a Global Spring, beginning this May [2012]’’ (‘‘Call for #GlobalSpring’’). The ‘‘rhetorical globalization’’ (Greene and Kuswa 17) of protest, protester, and place of protest is likely to be uneven. As Spivak notes ‘‘what really globalizes is capital and data and the other things are very uneven’’ (qtd. in Lahiri). Nevertheless, horizontal regionalism may be one way that ‘‘our fight for freedom, equality, peace, justice and real democracy across the world’’ can fold protest into ‘‘the Global Spring’’ (#Global Spring).

Acts of protest are key to breaking down the State’s constraints on identity and problematizing the status quo. True politics doesn’t come from waiting for the State to solve our problems, but action for real change on an individual level.

**Touza 08**[[11]](#footnote-11)

Colectivo Situaciones’s self-marginalization from the institutions is a nomadic investment, in the sense Deleuze and Guattari give to this expression: “The revolutionary knows that escape is revolutionary … provided one sweeps away the social cover on leaving, or causes a piece of the system to get lost in the shuffle” (Anti-Oedipus 277). A **nomadic thought** and practice whose lines of flight are always seeking to challenge the established dispositions of words, things, and bodies, **is revolutionary** not only in its content but also—fundamentally—**because it explores forms that escape** containment. Colectivo Situaciones belongs, in this sense, to the great tradition of twentieth century intellectual collectives that have been associated with movements of rupture in politics, arts, and science, challenging established schools and also the means of expression through which the new is to be said. The collective is a form that comes closer to making effective the death of the author, that “privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences” that Foucault talked about (“What Is an Author?” 101). The form sometimes maintains the notion of collectivity: Collectif Malgré Tout (Paris), Precarias a la Deriva (Madrid), Universidad Trashumante (Argentina).100 Other times, the figure of the individual author is contested by adopting an individual nom du plume, invented (Karen Eliot) or actually existing (Luther Bisset). In other cases, collectives take names that are purposively deceiving, like the Italian group that calls itself Wu Ming. For a nomadic collective, adopting a name is a risky operation. It concedes to the moment of writing the opportunity to build a homely space, a terrain of reassurance of the collective self that could put closure to the multiple becomings of affect between the members. Nomadic collectives do not just pick up names. Theirs have to be names that have some built-in ability, perhaps some sedimentation of references, that allows them to escape the **constraints of identity**—their job is to name non-identity. Situaciones took its a name from the Sartrean tradition, which the collective evokes to conjure both postmodern nihilism—the resigned acceptance that nothing can be done—and modern totalization— the desire to become majority, to become state. They identify themselves with a totality 234 that both dissolves totalization and carves a passage through the nothingness of present times: “we refuse being categorized with anything other than the multiplicity of struggles, creation, and art” (Colectivo Situaciones, Genocida en el Barrio). Their nomadism places them critically between the affirmation of multiple being and the dissolution of identity: “we are comically stuck between ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’” (Genocida en el Barrio). The multiplicity of the nomad has nothing to do with postmodern fragmentation and celebration of difference for its own sake (or with struggles for “the right to be different”), in which difference is resolved as an affirmation of a distinct identity. **Nomads are not** interested in **making policy recommendations.** Nor do they have anything to do with the themes of liberal pluralism: tolerance for difference or the search for a better position for the excluded within the world of spectacular representation. The nomad feels driven through a journey across different situations by differences that reveal the existence of the same: an assymmetry that is not relativism but the affirmation of a concrete universal, the assumption that the whole exists in the part—and only in the part—and that the situation, considered in the present (in the **‘here and now’ of action**)**, is loaded with infinite possibilities.** The wager on concrete situations is at the same time a renunciation of the project to change the world as an imaginary, virtual, trans-situational totality. As good nomads, Colectivo Situaciones go nowhere specifically. For them history is not a master-plan whose keys they have to find and act upon. For the nomads there is no freedom and justice as values to which they can adjust, but rather the latter are incarnated in each act of liberation, in any situation that rises to confirm its equality. There is no promise of a bright future at the end of the struggle. For the nomad the destination is never as interesting as the road itself. The possibilities of acting in the situation are grounded in neither hope nor utopia. There is no predetermined image of justice that justifies the action, but rather a fidelity to the struggles for liberty and equality here and now. Colectivo Situaciones seeks to maintain its nomadism alive by questioning the unity and finished status of their projects, sometimes using irreverent gestures that resemble dadaism, as, for instance, in Hipótesis 891, a book that contains transcriptions of conversations in the “workshops of thought” co-organized by the collective and the 235 unemployed workers’ movement of Solano, along with pieces written by each group and a speech delivered by John Holloway in the slum where the unemployed workers are based. The acknowledgment that the book is nothing more than a series of hypotheses honours the incomplete, ongoing character of the experiment of radical thought produced in collaboration. One needs to read the foreword to learn that the intriguing number 891 only makes reference to the street address where the workshop took place: “the number that indicates the site of production of that thought that, as such, resists all labeling and has functioned as shelter from the exposure to the elements of dogmatism, academicism, and ‘finished recipes’” (Colectivo Situaciones, Hipótesis 8). Being their own publishers has allowed Colectivo Situaciones to keep experimentation with forms alive. The limit of the dissolution of the author are the regulatory bodies of the state specialized in the publishing industry, which still require that each specimen of the form “book” be associated with an author. The collective thus warns the readers that the author function will be used there only to fulfill the government’s requirements and that their “intention as ‘authors’ is not what counts” (Hipótesis 10). The book should be valued not because of what is said by whoever says it, but by what results from the specific forces that combine with it. When referring to a militant collective, the attempt to rescue the functioning of the author with its individuating aspects is problematic. Inquiring about the proper names of the members of the collective, who have chosen to privilege the composition they form over their individualities, is questionable.101 Above all, the fidelity to **immanence**—to the potentia **that only exists in the act**—that characterizes research militancy finds suspicious any transformation of the living being of the collective into a figure whose name speaks for itself. For a collective that does not play the game of representation, avoiding virtualization is a fundamental form of resistance. Research Militancy and Counterpower The research militancy of Colectivo Situaciones is not a research method in the sense that participatory action research, institutional ethnography, and other forms of grassroots inquiry are, that is, a method that can be coordinated with different politics (e.g. organized around gender, environmental issues, etc.). Rather, it **is** a **reconsideration of** basic political questions: What is **politics**? What is thinking? How are they related? 236 And, mobilized by these questions, it takes a position in which politics and thinking are interchangeable concepts. When politics is understood as a practice that has to do with taking or keeping power, it has nothing to do with thinking. The politics that seeks to seize established positions of power uses thought, instrumentalizes it, but does not think. This conception of politics leads to a separation between those who think politics—the “intellectuals,” the Party, and other pedagogical figures—and those who practice politics—the masses, the working class, or another segment of a population conceived as the central subject of politics. Thought, in this sense, is transcendental in relation to practices. However, politics and thought can be seen as practices of the same order— equal in nature, as Spinoza and Deleuze would say—if they are **in** the“concrete and collective practices of life,” inhabiting “the very interior of popular **struggles** and experiencias—**as potentialities”** (Colectivo Situaciones, MOCASE). Colectivo Situaciones would agree with Deleuze and Guattari in that to be radical and escape the reterritorializing effects of the capitalist machine and the despotic state, **politics has to operate at the molecular level**, the microcosm where the investment of the social field begins. Politics and thought take place in the microphysical dimension **in which** bonds between people are constituted: **flows of** affect and **desire**, values and practices that **affirm or resist** the production and day-to-day reproduction of **the state** andthe market **in each of us.** At this concrete level, **thought and resistance come together** in the production of a new sociability, in the creation of affective bonds where poverty, the precariousness of life in free market capitalism, and/or repression have shattered them, in the creation of alternatives to wage labour and money-based relations between producers, in the experimentation with forms of organization **without hierarchies or permanent representatives.** Like Badiou and Rancière, Colectivo Situaciones see politics both as a discontinuity and as an event. Politics requires a disruption of the way things are, which is neither necessarily nor primarily violent and always involves the creation of new bonds. Politics begins with a subtraction from common sense, which includes knowledge: “**to think politically is** to subtract oneself, **to step aside of what** the **established knowledge decrees**” (MOCASE). In the situation, modes of being superior to those of capitalism can be experienced in action. The situation is where the dispute over values and meanings, 237 over individualism, instrumentalism, and communication is contested through the production of alternative compositions of affects, in new combinations of thought, politics, and desire. The situation becomes such a standpoint only when it can become a local and sovereign suspension of the time and space. It has to suspend, at its local level the abstract, virtual, spectacular view of representation and the market, produced by the state, capital, and the mass media. However, the suspension of the urgencies and fears determined by the media, the labour market, and the national or international political conjunctures is not aimed at isolating the situation. Even when an experiencia such as an unemployed workers movement in Argentina cuts itself out of these forces and viewpoints, it continues to be penetrated by them. Rather, what the situation does as a subtraction is to think the conjuncture through a gaze that plunges into multiplicity to produce practices that, nonetheless, pursue their own ends, independently of the conjuncture. Subtraction is an operation that reveals the actual infinity of the situation, the universality contained in its singularity. To experience the infinity of their own actions means, for a movement of the unemployed or the children of the disappeared, to show to themselves and to everybody else that “there are always more options than those the conjuncture offers as the only possible ones.” To think is precisely to “discover the possibilities that exist in the concrete situation” (Colectivo Situaciones Hipótesis 162).

## On Case

Modern democratic political structures are a ruse for fascism. **Murphy 5**[[12]](#footnote-12)

At the very beginning of their last joint work, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari note that “What is philosophy?” is a question that can only be posed “late in life, with the arrival of old age and the time for speaking concretely.”1 Their answer to that belated question is well known: “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts” (WP 2). Apparently the parallel question “What is democracy?” can only be posed belatedly as well, for despite decades of solo and collaborative work on politics, it is only in the chapter of that book entitled “Geophilosophy” that Deleuze and Guattari turn their attention to democracy as an extensive problem. Prior to this, **democracy had been** addressed either explicitly or implicitly as a subordinate or epiphenomenal issue, as **an adjective that occasionally modified** the noun that names the real focus of their political thought: **the State, the despotic agency of overcoding and transcendence.** A single example from Anti-Oedipus suffices to demonstrate this:As for democracies, how could one fail to recognize in them the despot who has become colder and more hypocritical, more calculating, since he must himself count and code instead of overcoding the accounts? …The differences [among historical variants of the State-form] could be determining only if the despotic State were one concrete formation among others, to be treated comparatively. But the despotic State is the abstraction to be realized…only as an abstraction. It assumes its immanent concrete existence only in the subsequent forms that cause it to return under other guises and conditions.2 This includes **the democratic guise**, which **does not constitute** an **escape from despotism but** merely **its most elaborate ruse.** This harsh judgment on democracy is only slightly tempered in What is Philosophy?, where they note that democratic, dictatorial and totalitarian States are all “isomorphous with regard to the world market insofar as the latter not only presupposes but produces inequalities of development.” As a result, “democratic States are so bound up with, and compromised by, dictatorial States, that the defense of human rights must necessarily take up the internal criticism of every democracy” (WP 106). Human rights themselves will be subject to critique below, but for the moment let us remain focused on democracy more generally. The trouble is that “**Democracies are majorities**,” thus molar and rigid, **and** they obstruct or repel “**the becoming** [which] is by its nature that which **always eludes the majority**” (WP 108). Becoming is singular and minoritarian, and as such it is the work of philosophy’s mode of deterritorialization which “takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people” (WP 99). This summoning forth that arises from philosophy’s absolute deterritorialization is also called utopia and revolution (WP 100-101). Of course Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that deterritorialization, both capitalist/relative and revolutionary/philosophical/absolute, must be reterritorialized: “The immense relative deterritorialization of world capitalism needs to be reterritorialized on **the modern** national **State**, which **finds an outcome in democracy, the new society of ‘brothers’**, the capitalist version of the society of friends” (WP 98). This accounts for the functional isomorphism of democratic and other State-forms within the world market, which is “the only thing that is universal in capitalism”: different Stateforms constitute distinct “models of realization” of the endlessly additive and blatantly incoherent axiomatic of capital (WP 106). Like the relative deterritorialization of capital, the absolute deterritorialization of philosophy is reterritorialized on the modern democratic State and human rights. But because there is no universal democratic State this movement implies the particularity of a State, of a right, or of the spirit of a people capable of expressing human rights in ‘its’ State and of outlining the modern society of brothers. In fact, it is not only the philosopher, as man, who has a nation; it is philosophy that is reterritorialized on the national State and the spirit of the people (WP 102). Hence Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of geophilosophy—rooted in Greece, France, England and Germany, perhaps developing in America, but emphatically not in Italy.3 We will return to this exclusion below. Nevertheless, human rights, like the national States that express them, are merely axioms that “can coexist on the market with many other axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of or suspend them even more than they contradict them” (WP 107). **Human rights conceived within this framework** do not give birth to a new people, the States that express them **do not map a new earth, and consequently modern democracy** does not constitute a philosophical concept, even if it **does pose a problem.** Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari insist that “this people and earth will not be found in our democracies,” but only in the thinking of the most aristocratic of philosophers like Nietzsche (WP 108)

The despotic nature of modern democracy lends way to Eurocentric subjectification. The alternative is key to the realization of true democracy, so it’s a prerequisite to the aff. **Murphy 5**[[13]](#footnote-13)

According to Negri’s reading, **Spinoza’s concept of democracy** rules out such irreversible transfer in advance: “The natural right of individuals, a universal given [as singular power], thus constitutes itself into public law by traversing the social antagonism [between individuals], not by denying it in some transcendental manner, but rather by constructing collective displacements.”9 Subjects do not irreversibly confer their powers upon the sovereign State, but preserve them within a framework of consensus that unifies without representation: “Democracy…means, then, that there is no alienation of power— neither in relation to its exercise, nor in relation to its formation or the specificity of executive action.”10 This negative definition, in terms of non-alienation, **can** also **be put** positively **as follows:** it is “the liberation of all social energies in a general conatus [desire or striving to survive] of the organization of the freedom of all. Continual and permanent.”11 From this point of view, “Legitimation is inalienably rooted in collectivity; only the collectively expressed potentia, only the creativity of the multitudo determines legitimacy.”12 What this means is that **even when a State** or institution **has been constituted, it is** not inoculated against the constitutive process of the multitude that gave rise to it. It is **constantly** andat every point (and not just at a few points and at strictly defined intervals) **under threat of** the **withdrawal of** the civil **consensus that constructed it.**13 For Spinoza and Negri, **this immanence** and permanence of the collective constitutive process is what **makes democracy the only** genuinely **absolute government. “Absolute” in this case does not refer to** “absolutism,” which would be the figure of the **fixed** and unalterable **transcendence of** the despot and **the State, but** rather to the unlimitedness of **a continuous** and immanent process of re-creation or **re-invention** that is **congruent with Deleuze and Guattari’s** definition of the absolute **deterritorialization** of philosophy itself: democracy…determined sub specie aeternitas…[is] a metamorphosis that does not stop, that has no end—it increasingly affirms the power of the ‘absolutum’ collective body, at the very moment in which it denies the presence of fear, terror, death….Therefore the imperium democraticum, because it is omnino absolutum, because it lives on eternity, is not limited to any [positive political] Constitution…but rather constantly transcends them all dynamically since it is ever more capable of perfection.14If it is not limited to **a**ny **specific** form of **constitution** (which **would** in fact **re-introduce** a version of the **irreversible** contractarian **transfer of right and power**), then rather than being one particular form of government among others, in fact “the **Spinozian** definition of **democracy is** the definition of ‘non-government’….[It] is **not a form of government but** rather a **social** activity of **transformation**” (ibid). Spinozian absolute democracy is not any historically given actual form, but rather the asymptotic virtual limit of the constitutive process, and thus it “can in no way be defined as a constitutional democracy, that is, as a form of government based on the division and balance of Powers and on their reciprocal dialectic”15 such as exists in contemporary democratic States. Democracy sub specie aeternitas is what Marx called permanent revolution.16 In order to grasp the novelty and power of this concept of democracy, we must grasp what Deleuze and Guattari would call its determining component: the multitude.17 As Hardt and Negri note, **the multitude is distinct from “the modern conception of the people [which] is** in fact a product of the nation-state, and survives only within its specific ideological context.”18 The people is **the product of a** double construction: the separation of a supposedly **homogeneous** (paradigmatically **European**) **people from** other, especially **colonized native groups through racial classification, and** a further **erasure of** the **internal differentiations** of this people (class, gender, age) **behind** a **hegemonic** figure of representational **Power** (E 103-4). As such the definition of the people is exclusive and membership in it is closed. The multitude, on the other hand, is “a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which is not homogeneous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclusive relation to those outside of it” (E 103).19

The aff assumes that the State is a transcendental entity that protects our rights and well-being. This locks individuals into pre-determined identities defined by the State. **Bell 3**[[14]](#footnote-14)

To understand a multiplicity in terms of the One or as a multiple of units (the French word used here is unités, which means both units and unities) would be to relate it to **a privileged form of being**, to a being that **operates** as “emanative cause” in that the things that come to be identified come to be **by** virtue of **a One** or multiple **that transcends them.** Socrates makes this position clear in the Euthyphro. It is not the diversity and multiplicity of pious actions that interests Socrates, but rather he wants “to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious.” (6e). Whatever their apparent diversity, there is from the perspective of Plato a privileged unity that is superior to the diversity it conditions. In the context of political reality, to give another example, **the** view of the **One** or the multiple **manifests itself within** the **theories that** either **see the State as based** up**on the rights** and liberties **of individuals** (i.e., as multiple units) **or** they prioritize the **welfare of society as** a whole (i.e., the One). In either case, the problem with **this view** for Deleuze is that it **fails to recognize** the fact **that political identities**, whether they be individuals, societies, classes, rights, etc., have to be constituted. Political identities (unités) **are not a** preordained **given but** are **constituted** and come into being **by** virtue of **a multiplicity of contingent factors** and conditions**.** “A people isn’t something preexistent,” Deleuze argues, but is something that “is constituted.”9 And it is with the concept of multiplicity that Deleuze begins to account for how **identities come to be constituted without** the need for **a transcendent, emanative cause.** This brings us to the next concept that is crucial to Deleuze’s work – assemblages. An assemblage, as the name itself might suggest, is a constituted (assembled) identity that is inseparable from a multiplicity. To state this with concepts discussed above, an assemblage is an immanent effect of a multiplicity as immanent cause, and thus an assemblage is inseparable from multiplicities. We can clarify this point by turning to the analysis of desire that Deleuze and Guattari offer in their two Capitalism and Schizophrenia books. In Anti-Oedipus, for example, desire is from the start argued to be productive. This was Freud’s great insight, at least as Deleuze and Guattari saw it, but the productions of desire came to be seen by Freud as predetermined by the Oedipal triangle of mommy-daddy-me – what Deleuze and Guattari call the “triangulation” of desire. For Deleuze and Guattari **desire, far from being predetermined by identity, is** understood to be **the multiplicity that produces identities –** “desiring-production is pure multiplicity, that is to say, an **affirmation** that is **irreducible to** any sort of **unity.”**10 **Desire** is for Deleuze an assemblage then to the extent that it both **entails** the **production of** an **identity** (i.e., as immanent cause) **and** it entails the desiring-productions (what Deleuze calls **‘lines of flight’**) **that elude** and transgress the **limits set forth by an assemblage.** This limit comes to be identified by Deleuze and Guattari as schizophrenia. There is thus a dual aspect to an assemblage, or two poles – there is what Deleuze will call the fascist and paranoiac pole that returns every production to an all-determining identity, and there is the schizophrenic (sometimes also called cancerous) pole of a desiring-production that fails to maintain the immanent limits necessary for proper functioning. Desiringproductions forever risk collapsing into the stranglehold of fascism wherein desire desires its own repression, or it risks exploding into a self-destructive chaos. To state this point yet again but with a different example, artistic productions risk either collapsing into the cliché of repeating the same well-worn formulas, or they risk becoming so unconstrained and chaotic that they fail to say anything.

The aff’s approach to socioeconomic conditions presupposes fixed social identity which enables the State to normalize. **Bell 3**[[15]](#footnote-15)

Both Deleuze and Foucault, therefore, would be critical of John Rawls’ basic programme, as set forth in his A Theory of Justice, where Rawls states that he “shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies.”35 Although Rawls formulates the “closed system” of society as a provisional step, he makes it clear that other problems will “prove more tractable in light” of the given assumption, and so in the end society is understood to be a closed, predetermining identity. And this is where Nozick correctly, in our opinion, criticizes Rawls. The criticism, in short, is that Rawls bases his call for a redistribution of wealth as a fair proposition on the basis of claiming that there are benefits of social cooperation that transcend and are greater than the sum of the individuals who cooperate. Nozick has numerous problems with this position, but ultimately they all go back to his original claim that there is no social entity, just individuals.36 Deleuze would agree that there is no predetermining social entity, an already constituted, closed system, but this is not to say that Deleuze would embrace Nozick. In fact, there are important ways in which the concerns of Rawls are precisely the concerns of Deleuze. One could say that **Deleuze too is concerned with** what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society,” by which Rawls means the idea of a “structure [that] contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by **economic and social circumstances**.”37 To state this in Deleuze’s terminology, Deleuze is interested in the assemblage of segments, both molar (class, economic position, etc.) and molecular 35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 8. 36 For Nozick’s critique of Rawls, see Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 183-197. 37 A Theory of Justice, p. 7.21 (beliefs, desires, expectations, and hopes), **where**by **some** groups and **individuals** are constituted in such a way that they **become excluded from** various other dominant **positions of power.** To the extent then that social assemblages produce hierarchies of entrenched power that predetermine the hopes and expectations of what one can do and become – e.g., the traditional rigid segmentation of women as inferior to men which led women to set their sights lower than men – then Deleuze shares Rawls’ efforts to critique and undermine the effectiveness of such entrenched powers.38 **What Deleuze does not agree with**, however, **is Rawls’ basic premise that** whatever solution **one** attempts **must assume the already existent identity of society as a “closed system.”** If one makes such an assumption one inevitably becomes, according to Deleuze, a reformer. **A reformer seeks change** for sure**, but** a **change that will make** of a unity **a** true, proper **unity.** There are the **political reformers such as Rawls**, but there are others who call for reform in the family (return to its true unity as the nuclear family), morals (return to the true set of morals), etc. Deleuze argues that reformers **are fundamentally limited because they presuppose the closed unity and** seek simply to establish such a unity.39 They **fail to think the “outside,” to be truly creative and cause the system to become other.** Rather than becoming a reformer, Deleuze’s political theory calls for becoming revolutionary. It is to this call that we now turn.

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